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After the events of 9/11, the academic field of terrorism studies proliferated and 
hundreds of articles and books were quickly produced to explain the assaults on the 
United States. A country which had been relatively isolated from the anti-colonial 
terrorist ‘surge’ of the 1970s had become the target for spectacular acts of violence 
inspiring considerable questioning of why America?2 Indeed, those already ensconced 
within terrorism studies complained that suddenly everyone seemed to be an instant 
expert, not only on the sources of terrorism but on al-Qaeda and radical Islam.3 In the 
post 9/11 era, the study of terror – once rather a niche area – became the key topic in 
International Relations. This was certainly understandable as 9/11, rather like the 
collapse of the USSR, had taken everyone by surprise.4 
So as European states such as France and the United Kingdom confront multiple acts 
of terrorism from firebombs on trains, men in white vans crashing into pedestrians 
outside mosques, through attacks on police at Westminster, the murder of a Catholic 
priest, the ramming of crowds in Nice, to a bomber detonating a suicide vest at a pop 
concert, it is worth asking what we know and what we understand about contemporary 
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terrorism and our responses to it. Almost two decades of war in Afghanistan, years of 
Western intervention around the globe and multiple terrorist atrocities since the al-
Qaeda attacks on the US homeland have characterised international politics and 
reshaped the study of terrorism. 
Scholars who had spent years labouring over terrorism found themselves 
overwhelmed by ‘new entrants’ to the subject, many of whom had previously been 
rather ‘sniffy’ about actually studying the men and women of violence. From this 
particular allegation we must exclude those scholars who had produced valuable work 
on Ireland. Indeed, the’ troubles’ in Northern Ireland had spawned a whole field of 
useful investigation into nationalist violence.5 Even there, though, after the Good 
Friday agreement and the demise of the Provisional IRA, the specific nationalist 
challenge to the British state seemed over. During the later years of the 1990s, a new 
era of harmony in international relations seemed set to prevail. Not only was the Irish 
question resolved, South Africa emerged from apartheid and Communism was 
vanquished. In the spirit of optimism that accompanied the end of the Cold War, some 
respected figures claimed that war had gone away or been unlearnt and that soft 
power would predominate.6 All this promised a new century which seemed at least for 
Western states a somewhat optimistic proposition.  
The shock of 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq yielded a lengthy 
period of sombre reflection. Not only did we ponder how men armed with box cutters 
could attack the remaining superpower but a series of thorny questions arose. How 
could a war of liberation in Iraq turn into a bloody defeat for Western politics? How 
could coalition forces fail in Afghanistan and what remedy should be invoked in that 
particular crisis? How had the chaos of Syria occurred and in turn generated a massive 
migrant crisis? And had years of Western intervention created Isis? In short, had 
terrorism ‘worked’ in the sense of provoking the West into extravagant and hubristic 
foreign policies?  
There was much to preoccupy the academic and policy communities, however ‘new’ 
some scholars were to the actual ‘meat’ of terrorism studies. There were also pressing 
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issues for those who studied the phenomenon of war: How had wars of pacification 
and regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan become first counter-insurgencies and 
then in essence counter-terror campaigns? This conflation of counter-insurgency and 
counter-terror provided much to query – not the least was the questions of linkage 
between these wars and the multiple terror attacks on European cities and those much 
further afield in say Australia and Canada, 
What should the response be to the threats from al-Qaeda emboldened and reinforced 
by, in particular, the debacle in Iraq? How did the fight against terrorism become the 
justification for the armed drone killing of ‘terrorists’ such as the UK citizen ‘Jihadi John’ 
and the execution by drone strike of the notorious Anwar Awlaki, a US cleric. These 
executions (along with many others) were welcomed in some quarters (but by no 
means all) as a proportionate and legitimate response to the threats and dangers 
posed by these individuals.7 Thus some commentators became preoccupied not just 
with the causes of terrorism but with the ethics and legality of killing by a state before 
a trial or an act of terrorism had even taken place. This particular issue was rendered 
even more fascinating as a supposedly ‘liberal’ President such as Obama oversaw the 
introduction of ‘kill lists’ and the obfuscation of the truth over  the collateral damage to 
those around the target of a drone attack.  
This review – through the prism of four important texts, two old and two new – aims to 
ask how ‘we’ arrived at the state of anxiety which arguably characterises contemporary 
politics. These four books are worth reading (perhaps revisiting in the case of 
O’Sullivan and Wilkinson) as they provide touchstones for the academy and our own 
troubled times. O’Sullivan and Wilkinson were writing on this subject in the 1970s and 
1980s when terrorism had a very particular shape. English and Shane write in a period 
when the threat from Islamic State and its adherents seem most dramatic and 
threatening, overtaking even the notorious al-Qaeda in both numbers and influence. 
All these authors from O’Sullivan – a political theorist of some note – to the renowned 
journalist Scott Shane grapple with themes and ideas which are still clearly important 
to those seeking to understand current threats.  
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Ideology, Terrorism and the State 
Noel O’Sullivan begins this edited collection with a discussion of ideology and the 
relationship to terrorism. This is important as the term ideology seems to have been 
replaced by the term extremism. This is something of a problem, at least in my view. 
The concept of ‘ideology’ has now largely disappeared because it presupposes that 
there is such a thing as a ‘non-ideological’ standpoint. There is not at least according 
to O’Sullivan. He explains that the age old Western belief in the possibility of a 
privileged supra-political position utilising the concept of ideology regardless of 
whether it was a Liberal or Marxist agenda has been overturned. He argues that the 
absolute nature of ‘values’ and therefore a claim to a politically privileged position such 
as in the Cold War period has been replaced by a mode of politics in which all beliefs, 
values and claims are essentially contestable 8   
 O’Sullivan points out that traditionally we have assumed that terrorism was a 
‘peculiarity’ of left or right wing ideologies. We could and did explain terrorism as a 
function of these beliefs whether it was left wing terrorists or those on the right. On the 
other hand, he also points out that we for many years saw terrorism as arising from 
the malign individual figure that encouraged atrocities. Let us return to the first point 
as O’Sullivan is most interesting and indeed relevant in his claim that terrorism is 
connected with the modern liberal democratic style and tradition in Europe. O’Sullivan 
traces the roots of this to the French Revolution and three crucial assumptions which 
accompanied the politics and ideologies of subsequent periods.9 
The first assumption led men to believe that it was within their power to remake society 
from top to bottom. There was the possibility for radical change. Although there had 
certainly been visions of a utopia before, none had seemed achievable. So O’Sullivan 
makes the point that without the idea of change and very radical change that 
accompanied the French Revolution, the more ambitious terrorist visions of 
confronting and transforming the state would have been impossible.   
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This idea of ‘remaking’ society was at the heart of the Cold War. Not only was 
Communism forcibly imposed throughout Central and Eastern Europe but the Marshall 
Plan was devised and executed to keep Western Europe in a democratic style of 
politics. We should also note that the national and anti-colonial revolutions after 1945 
utilised widespread ‘terror’ to persuade the equally violent colonial powers to withdraw. 
The anti-colonial movements incorporated in some instances ‘proxy’ groups utilised 
by either the Russians or the Americans to achieve Cold War aims. Hence the Russian 
sponsorship and backing for certain groups in Angola and the Horn of Africa as well 
as the US backing of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan and an array of groups 
throughout Latin and Central America. One reason for revisiting Wilkinson is because 
some of those in Critical Terrorism Studies have roundly condemned him for what they 
see as his defence of US behaviour during the Cold War.10  Perhaps, but there is also 
a broader point here.  Wilkinson reminds us of the long shadows cast by terrorism and 
reactions to it during the Cold War on to our own troubled times. The 9/11 attacks were 
directly related to a series of decisions taken by successive US Governments seeking 
to defeat Marxist-inspired or backed regimes throughout the Middle East and other 
regions of the world.  As ‘we now know’, it was US arms and money that aided Osama 
bin Laden in Afghanistan fostering his belief that having defeated one superpower – 
the USSR – another could also be ‘picked off’.   
A second assumption highlighted by O’Sullivan is the belief that man could be made 
‘good’. Originating with Rousseau, the theme was that of ‘evil’, not as an essential or 
intrinsic part of the human condition, but as originating in the actual structure of society. 
The point here is that the structure could be reworked through appropriate social 
change and hence man would indeed be made good. So political action was neither 
about stability nor order but about a transformative mission. Politics became rather 
simple in this new style. This mentality meant the identification of an ‘out’ group which 
could be held responsible for everything that was amiss in society. Hence in the French 
Revolution the monarchs, the aristocrats and the priests had to be dispensed with. In 
the Russian Revolution so too did the Capitalists and of course in Fascism, the Jews 
had to be eradicated.11 All of these groups utilised ‘terror’ for ideological ends. In the 
                                                          
10 See Jeffrey .A. Sluke, ‘The Contribution of Anthropology to Critical Terrorism Studies’ in Jackson, Smyth and 
Gunning (edited) Critical Terrorism Studies, op.cit. Pp.138-155. 
11 Noel O’Sullivan, op.cit.pp.8-9.  
case of Fascism, terror became institutionalised by the state, was routinised and 
carried out in the name of national unity and survival. In the case of nationalist/colonial 
struggles, terror became a weapon not just of the state but of those opposing the state. 
In this respect, people like Franz Fanon identified the ‘out’ group as the imperial 
powers leading to nationalist and anti-colonial movements demanding decolonization, 
sovereignty and liberty. 12 
This particular feature of violent politics was also linked to another development in 
politics which has according to O’Sullivan done more than anything else to facilitate 
terrorism – that is the idea of ‘the people’ or, as we would term it, ‘popular sovereignty’. 
So, politics and the exercise of power are only legitimate if it is conferred from below 
by the ‘people’. The problem here is that of course ‘the people’ can be justified in any 
way either by a Government or by those seeking to defy a State. Terrorists have quite 
often used ‘the support of the people’ to justify their own actions. State leaders too 
invoked a whole host of repressive measures such as torture, incarceration or more 
latterly execution by armed drone strike in the name of the people.   
In the West, O’Sullivan argues the problem is made much worse by the idea of ‘liberty’. 
Western notions of liberty are intimately connected with ideas of individual autonomy 
and self-realization. As Paul Wilkinson argued, liberty can be a form of egotism – a 
kind of action taken for its own sake and a glorification: we need  only ponder the van 
attack on worshippers at Finsbury Mosque or those strapping on fake suicide vests to 
launch a frenzied attack on innocent people in London. O’Sullivan and Wilkinson both 
point to the long-standing search for an understanding of these actions in Liberal 
societies.13  
Here, though, O’Sullivan, in addition to making the connection between democracy 
and terrorism, has also pointed to the linkage between trends in the general nature of 
war and strategy and the related way terrorists have acted. As O’Sullivan commented, 
the increasingly barbaric conduct of terrorists is in his view related to the elimination 
of the general distinction between combatant and non-combatant.14 O’Sullivan 
examines the growth in assassination as a political technique in the twentieth century 
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but also the conduct of World War Two and especially the use of strategic bombing by 
the Great Powers to break enemy morale. Whatever the original intention for strategic 
bombing, as the conflict intensified the massacre of civilians was justified in terms of 
national survival, shortening the war and, in the case of the atomic bombing of Japan, 
saving lives.15  
In terms of the history of war we have something quite novel. As George Orwell argued 
in the public and acrimonious debate over the bombing of German cities by the 
Allies,16 area bombing made war more ‘democratic’. While young men would perish 
on the battlefield, at sea or in the air, everyone  on the home front was now a potential 
victim, this included children and the middle aged. Thus, in the name of prevailing, 
winning or eradicating ideological enemies, such as the fascists in Germany and 
Japan, there were no innocents or civilians. Therefore we witness throughout the 
twentieth century an increase in violence carried out by states, but also by sub state 
groups whatever their ideological agenda. The increased lethality in operations by 
terrorists has been well described by scholars such as Bruce Hoffman.17 In particular, 
attacking civilians seems to be the easy part, not just for terrorists but for groups of 
every variety. So while non state terrorism has been responsible for between a few 
hundred to a few thousand victims on an annual basis, states have killed, tortured and 
oppressed millions of people.  
The idea of non-combatant as victim fitted neatly into one of the most influential works 
produced in the 1990s – the very years during which war had supposedly lost its 
purpose. Mary Kaldor produced a thesis of both ‘new wars’ and old wars.18 This had 
at its core the proposition that war had become indiscriminate and characterised by 
savage acts of violence with civilians as the target. In this sense conflict was not 
conducted in a strategic manner – multiple actors merely pursued short-term financial 
or political goals, hence confusing those states which tried to intervene and promote 
resolution. As Kaldor pointed out, many of those involved thrived on conflict, 
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dislocation and perpetual chaos.19 Kaldor inspired an important debate about who dies 
in contemporary conflict inspiring some others to disagree about the upward trajectory 
of civilian as the primary victim of conflict. Here we should note the work of Duffield 
and Newman on this question.20 
There is however beyond that particular debate something else lurking.  The post-Cold 
War period suggests the re-emergence of a deeper kind of ‘barbarism’ than the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants, in the form of the Islamic 
‘demonization’ of unbelievers (i.e. the ultimate barbarism is the politicization of the 
distinction between believers and unbelievers).  Carl Schmitt’s, in his Nomos of the 
Earth,21 suggested that this most barbaric (or anti-political) of all cleavages 
characterized the West itself in the medieval period, but was overcome in the early 
modern period by the Westphalian era’s willingness to replace demonization of the 
opponent by a political confrontation based on the mutual acknowledgement of the 
validity of different standpoints and willingness to reconcile them by non-violent 
methods. Yet the Westphalian era was an exceptional, very sophisticated and 
essentially fragile achievement which always remained under pressure, especially 
after the emergence of the ideological divisions of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. The present day situation seems to be that the last remnants of the 
Westphalian ‘political’ settlement have finally collapsed due to the superimposition of 
religious fundamentalism onto the ideological divisions of the modern West. 
For O’Sullivan there was an inevitable slide into the killing of innocents. Liberal states 
such as Britain and the United States in the main denied their part in this process.  
After all, even though terrorist groups may have broadened their areas and targets for 
attack, the state or at least major Western states did try, or so it is argued,  to find 
more proportionate ways of conducting their military affairs.22 The RMA seemed after 
the Gulf War of 1991 to hold out the promise of proportionate and precise modes of 
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operating. As the Kosovo war of 1998-1999  proved, war could be won ‘simply’ from 
the air. The destruction of the Serbian state in a quick air campaign seemed to herald 
a new era of ‘cost free war’ at least for the Western States involved. Virtual War, as it 
was dubbed by the public intellectual Michael Ignatieff,23 also apparently signalled an 
unassailable Western dominance in international affairs. Intervention could be made 
through choice not necessity and innocents protected (apart from those caught by 
‘mistakes’ in failures of intelligence and targeting) in the bloody business of war as 
centres of power, dictators and warlords were targeted in the name of stability as well 
as humanity. Tony Blair remarked in his Chicago speech of 1999, ‘we cannot turn our 
backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights in other countries if we still want 
to be secure.’24 The RMA offered the magic elixir for just such interventions. The RMA 
too seemed, at least for Neoconservatives, to provide the means for challenging the 
sources of authoritarianism in the Middle East and for addressing the roots of global 
terrorism.     
The actual 9/11 wars were meant (however much there was a spirit of vengeance at 
play) to be conducted in just such a rapid manner to reshape the Middle East. The 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 in response to the ‘plot against America’ was at first 
conducted from the air and with Special Forces. The Taliban which had harboured the 
architect of the attacks – Osama bin Laden – was summarily removed and there was 
little initial cost to the attacking forces.25 Afghanistan, and Iraq too after the invasion 
of 2003, were proclaimed as successes. Although the ill judged ‘Mission 
Accomplished’26 speech became emblematic of the over-confidence with which both 
campaigns were mounted, at the time Western superiority seemed to prevail and to 
provide some satisfaction against the 9/11 conspirators. The ‘mission accomplished’ 
version notably ignored the ‘collateral’ damage – both human and ecological – inflicted 
upon the people and fabric of Afghanistan27 during the opening phases of the 
campaign as well as the controversy over the number of ‘civilians’ killed in Iraq. We 
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will return to the beguilement of precision and accuracy when discussing armed drone 
strikes.  
9/11 and the subsequent wars are worth reflecting upon in the light of both O’Sullivan 
and Wilkinson and also the work of Mary Kaldor. Neither of the first two authors writing 
in the 1970s and 1980s could have foreseen the spectacular nature of the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11. Indeed Wilkinson’s book does have a rather old-fashioned air 
especially in the middle sections when he discusses attacks on embassies, kidnapping 
of diplomats and sieges. Despite a quaint style, the mounting evidence drawn from 
both Wilkinson and indeed O’Sullivan was the increasingly important nature of the 
international politics of terrorism and certainly in Wilkinson the growing threat to liberal 
states at home and abroad from those who wished to launch assaults on the West. 
But there is something else here too. The ‘countervailing trend’ towards the use of 
technological fixes such as air power was pervaded and underpinned by a ‘moralistic’ 
view of global politics and the purposes of military vigour.28  This intensification of the 
Western ‘moralization’ of politics after 9/11 – whilst noticing (as Schmitt does) that this 
moralizing tendency goes back at least to the First World War, with the US 
demonization of the Kaiser after 1918 as a prime example – has shaped not only policy 
and politics but the academy and terrorism scholarship.  
Terrorism and the Liberal State  
The second book under review here is perhaps one of the earliest and most profound 
expositions of how liberal societies should respond to the threat and reality of 
terrorism. The book has had many editions and the cover of my edition is both strikingly 
old fashioned but horribly relevant. Police officers from the London Met draw guns to 
encounter a terrorist threat. The visual imagery is from the 1970s but strikingly familiar 
to 2017 and the attacks on Westminster and then London generally. Paul Wilkinson is 
in many ways the founder of terrorism studies in the United Kingdom. This book is 
therefore located both in a time when the scholarly discipline of terrorism studies was 
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on the margins of Political Science. Indeed, despite Wilkinson’s distinguished career, 
right up until the events of 9/11 many remained sceptical about the academic 
endeavour to find answers not just to the puzzle of malcontents in our midst but to the 
practical challenge of how to deal with an IRA or an ETA. In this sense Richard English 
writing some two decades after Wilkinson had the advantage of ‘knowing’ how the IRA 
campaign ended and the satisfaction of seeing ETA lay down its arms and mission 
against the Spanish state. Wilkinson though was quite literally in the ‘thick of it’ with 
the attempt on his life in London by the IRA in 1990.   
Wilkinson was keenly aware not just of the dangers but the prejudice – widespread – 
in his own words against terrorism studies (indeed he compared it to the bias against 
War Studies!). This book begins with a note that: ‘There have been encouraging signs 
over the past few years of a growth in scholarly interest in the phenomenon of political 
terrorism’.29 This however has become increasingly contested ground as to what the 
purpose of the study of terrorism should be. Wilkinson always regarded part of his duty 
to provide advice and caution to those in power. What he could not have foreseen was 
how his work would be judged by a newer generation. His critics perceived not a 
speaking of ‘truth to power’ but a justification of state power.  
Wilkinson therefore became something of a target for some of those labouring in what 
is now known as Critical Terrorism Studies. He was of an earlier school -  ‘orthodox’ 
in many respects:  hence he was a ‘leading figure in orthodox terrorism studies and 
the pro state terrorism industry’.30 Note the conflation of orthodox and pro-state terror. 
Here it is neither my vocation or purpose to rescue Paul Wilkinson  from those who 
depict him in a certain and negative manner. But let us pause for a minute to examine 
the rather lengthy charge sheet against him. The first accusation is that, in the period 
when perhaps he was at the height of his powers and influence, the terrorism studies 
literature he and many others published, overwhelmingly replicated the claims made 
by the Reagan Administration that much of the contemporary acts of terror were in fact 
sponsored by Moscow. It is argued that first, that this was at best disingenuous as the 
US itself was supporting terroristic activities in, to name but a few countries, 
Nicaragua, Angola and Afghanistan but second it was also subversive in terms of 
                                                          
29 Wilkinson, op.cit. p.iv.  
30 See Jeffrey A.Sluke, in Jackson, Breen and Gunning, Critical Terrorism Studies, op.cit.  
knowledge. So, according to some of Wilkinson’s critics the actions of the Reagan 
government during the Second Cold War were accepted, endorsed by Wilkinson and 
critical voices ‘silenced’. This problem of ‘silencing’ is of course one which is used on 
a routine and sometimes rather useful basis to discuss and challenge hegemonic 
discourse and practice.31 
However, the idea that there was a silence over the multiple acts of violence sponsored 
by the US is a rather curious claim.  Scholars of the Cold War were keenly aware of 
the superpower competition, the use of proxies and the manner in which resistance 
movements were taken up and sponsored by states. To blame Paul Wilkinson for 
endorsing the view of the Soviet Union as a sponsor of terror is hardly useful at this 
historical juncture – the Cold War was after all fought on any number of fronts which 
certainly involved proxy forces, advisors, arms and money supplied by Russia, the 
United States, China and states such as Iran and Libya. This much is now well 
known.32 An actual reading of Wilkinson writing in 1977 provides the following: 
It will be shown that the Soviet Union has considerable record of involvement in this 
type of conflict, and this has important consequences for Western internal and external 
defence policy and strategy. However, the reader should be reassured that the author 
does not seek to present any general conspiracy theory or Cold War grand 
simplification to ‘explain’ contemporary terrorist phenomena…..Terrorism is not the 
monopoly of any ideology or cause.33 
That final line is crucial – terrorism is and remains ubiquitous. So, the more essential 
issue is what legacies this behaviour of states in the Cold War has bequeathed in 
terms of contemporary terrorism and global instability. Both Wilkinson and Critical 
Studies theorists are in their very different ways correct – history and an accurate and 
open reading of it really matters. Hence, ‘denial’ not silencing is important. So just as 
it is now broadly accepted that the considerable US support for the Muhjadeen to 
defeat the Soviet Army in Afghanistan permitted the emergence of al-Qaeda, of which 
more later, we need to look at other states which sponsored terrorist groups and 
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actions, such as Iran. In this sense, Terrorism and the Liberal State can tell us little of 
the pivotal and revolutionary year of 1979 in global affairs although Wilkinson does in 
later work discuss the challenge of Iran and sponsorship of terrorist groups at some 
length.   
The omission though in 1977 is fascinating.  Scholars in International Relations do not 
have crystal balls with which to predict and advise. Wilkinson’s book was written before 
the events of 1979. And here we do need to take the claims of Critical Terrorism 
scholars seriously.34 Even though it had been widely accepted that the US 
Government and its intelligence agencies were taken by surprise by events in 
Teheran,35 ‘we now know’36 different. Recent revelations cast doubt on any accepted 
wisdom pointing rather to the complicity of the Carter Administration in establishing 
the new and ultimately for Washington, the troublesome regime in Teheran.  
Thus, Iran emerged as a revolutionary power, with the rise of a fundamentalist Islamist 
state in the Middle East bookmarking the modern era. It was Iran and then Syria which 
provided the political, religious and financial support to terrorist groups like the PLO, 
Hamas and Hezbollah. This engendered the wave of kidnapping of Western journalists 
and, after 1979, the beginning of suicide attacks. It also provided for the post Cold War 
challenges posed by groups disaffected by the new shape of politics and undermined 
by the loss of their sponsors in Moscow – and antagonised by the actions taken by 
Western states. Here though is something rather disingenuous in the discussion.   
The leader of the UK Labour Party Jeremy Corbyn was roundly condemned for making 
a link between the conduct of wars abroad and the terror attacks on the United 
Kingdom.37 The denial of the linkage between foreign policy and domestic harmony is 
commonplace. This is odd as the very perpetrators of some terrorist attacks such as 
Mohammed Sidique Khan the leader of the 7/7 attacks highlight the connection as 
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prime motivating factors.38 Therefore one considerable challenge that we need to 
address are not just the accuracy of the historical record but the linkages and the 
‘blowback’ from actions taken earlier. 39 
Mary Kaldor has been forceful in her publications and pronouncements  about the 
growing interconnectedness of the world. In a powerful commentary she makes it clear 
that part at least of the explanation for contemporary acts of violence is the insecurity 
that individuals encounter through globalisation. It follows therefore that a sense of 
impotence arises when crucial decisions that affect everyday life are taken at a further 
and further remove. As she points out, the team of Saudis who committed suicide on 
9/11 were all educated in the West but were from migrant families typically moving 
from countryside to town experiencing cultural and social losses while still not fully 
integrated into their new lives. As Kaldor usefully phrases it, ‘regressive’ globalisation 
creates insecurities. (And as we will see also immense opportunities for the spreading 
of propaganda by those dissatisfied by poverty, inequality or the denial of liberty by 
corrupt regimes or occupying powers.) 
The typical recruits to these movements are in her words ‘restless’ young men often 
educated for jobs that no longer exist because of the decline of the state or the 
industrial sector and because they lack income unable to marry. Membership of 
groups whether criminal or terrorist (and there is overlap) provide meaning, a sense 
of historical relevance and, in some cases, adventure. Perhaps more than anyone else 
she provides the very notions of interconnectedness to potentially provide an 
explanation of why a suicide bomber in Iraq is linked to the fate of a young man in a 
Bradford, a Cardiff or a London.  
Does Terrorism Work?  
Richard English provides some resolution to the idea of foreign policy as rebounding 
on domestic politics. His first chapter provides the most satisfactory explanation I have 
read on the linkages between events during the fag end of the Cold War and 
contemporary terrorism.    
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Professor English is a distinguished historian of the Irish troubles and knows more 
than probably anyone else working in the academy about this particular type of 
terrorism.  As was noted earlier, English has the advantage of having watched not just 
the low points of the violence in Ireland but having witnessed how it (or most of it) all 
ended. The chapter in this collection on Ireland reflects upon that lifetime of experience 
and draws upon interviews with some of the protagonists involved.  
The English text is a product of its time. If I use the word ‘intimacy’ to start this section 
the reader might find this odd. Bear with me. There is an intimacy which is marked in 
the accounts provided by English of the ordinariness of the terrorists he has 
encountered. Perhaps by the time he meets these men (mainly men) they have grown 
old, tired and reflective. They are however in this account, rational actors – not, for 
English, in his account irrational psychopaths or sociopaths. These terrorists in his 
investigation seem focused on objectives which can be achieved and target 
governments that can be compelled to change direction. In this sense, terrorism 
‘works’ or partially works. Most notable was the case of the Madrid bombing of the 
train system in 2004. This was in the judgment of English effective, at least tactically 
– Spain revoked its support for the war in Iraq. This in turn may well have set the 
example for an ISIS to emerge. (The coercive effects of the bombs may have 
contributed to a policy shift but the bungling of the response to the attacks by the 
Spanish Government was also instructive. Originally blaming ETA without proof the 
opposition party was able to force a policy transformation). State responses to 
terrorism as English point out may change politics more powerfully than the actual act 
of terror. 
English understandably spends part of this book on his home intellectual turf of Ireland 
and nationalist terrorism.  Much can be said of a campaign that has ended (apart from 
the occasional IED threat and mutterings and sputtering of a new campaign) in some 
form of success on all sides. From the low points of the killings of the 1970s at a 
Guildford or a Birmingham, through the spectacular events of 1979 at Warren point 
and Mullaghmore, there is a catalogue of ugliness  right up  until the Good Friday 
Agreement. The boldness of Tony Blair in bringing about a conclusion to the armed 
violence and establishing a devolved government seemed effective. Terrorists placed 
down their weapons, the British State relaxes, at least to a point, and like ETA, 
separatists seem old fashioned in a world of the European Union, and a post apartheid 
South Africa.    
Some critics have been rather offended by what they perceive as a failure by English 
to condemn acts of barbarity out of hand by, say, the IRA.40 But I wonder if this arises 
from the very fact that these terrorists have laid down their arms and armaments and 
settled into a twilight world of both regret and, for others, justification of acts which 
even now evoke considerable controversy and continual upset. Richard Hofstadter 
once argued that he knew it was ‘risky but I still write history out of my engagement 
with the present’.41 To be fair to Professor English, to write from the present is to know 
that the ambitions of most of the Republican terrorists had been defeated. Even if 
power sharing and representation in devolved government remain a significant 
achievement for the nationalist communities these fall far short of the demands for a 
united island of Ireland. In that sense the terrorists did not achieve their strategic goals.    
Here with the sociability of the voices as recounted by English, as in the volume by 
Shane, we literally hear, even if we wish to reject, these conversations which seek to 
justify acts of terrorism. Whether it is the sound of the former Provisional IRA man or 
that of Siddique Khan, the 7/7/suicide bomber, Richard English provides us with the 
narrations and the language of the ‘soldier’ or the paramilitary at war. Again scholars 
have been critical of English for supposed ambivalence in his presentation and his 
‘exculpation’ of the bad guys. Is English too easy going on the villains? Or is this the 
type of presentation that allows us to see not just the unsavoury and perhaps 
delusional but the underlying terrorist calculation – that actually democratic 
governments can and do lose their will in wars, in blood and treasure and tire of the 
seemingly endless blowback of decisions taken years before by politicians oblivious 
to or entirely pragmatic over the consequences of partition, repression, inequality and 
state violence.   
English may be criticised of side stepping the issue of whether terrorists have parity 
or should have equivalence with the state: for giving voice and publicity to those who 
seek to murder. But his overall point is that sometimes terror works; and this is the 
caveat, it works sometimes and in some nationalist conflicts. Here he points to the 
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construction of Israel and the bloody establishment of modern Algeria as examples of 
when terrorism has actually worked. Those brutal conflicts, as English knows only too 
well have cast long and ghastly shadows into our own time. For those subscribing to 
neo-colonial explanations as inspiring contemporary terrorism, questions loom large 
over the recent attacks in France and the trauma of both the French Algerian War and 
the violence in Algeria during the 1990s.42 There is more work to be done here.  
Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this book is that its concentration on the 
question of whether terrorism ‘works’ risks obscuring the deep crisis of state legitimacy 
in so far as the authority of the state over those who do not acknowledge it is 
concerned. This crisis is evident, for example, when English gives or seems to provide 
a moral parity (in some cases at least) to the voices of terrorists and that of the state. 
In this sense the academic story (certainly through these books) seems to be the 
disintegration of the concept of terrorism into a debate about the political and the 
moral. So the debate over English’s book is in essence about the past reduction of the 
political (and the historical) into the moral.  
At the beginning, English turns his experienced hand to the current threat from radical 
Islam. The opening of his book concentrates on ‘jihadist’ terrorism and the genesis 
and development of al-Qaeda. As he points out, before the 9/11 attacks little research 
had been carried out on this group or its leader, Osama bin Laden. Much of what 
English goes on to describe though is now common knowledge. The organisation was 
established in Peshawar in Pakistan in the summer of 1988. The aim was to continue 
violent jihad beyond the anti-Soviet campaign which was dragging to an end. As noted 
earlier, bin Laden had been outraged by the invasion of Afghanistan and the campaign 
against Moscow had become a mission. Backed by the CIA and through the Pakistani 
ISI, bin Laden became somewhat famous in the Middle East for his opposition to 
Communism. Although essentially a money man securing funding for the insurgents 
he had also fought alongside the Mujahedeen in at least two bloody encounters with 
Soviet forces.  
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Once that war was essentially over, al-Qaeda (meaning ‘the base’ in Arabic) was 
established and drawn from the ranks of the foreign fighters who had been engaged 
in the Afghan War. Their target was no longer the Communist superpower but its rival 
the United States. Some seasoned commentators argue that bin Laden, believing that 
he had contributed to the destruction of one great power, could just as readily defeat 
the other.43 So fighters inspired by bin Laden (and those with their own concerns) took 
on US forces in Yemen in 1992, supported the anti-American missions in Somalia from 
1992 and targeted US assets globally. A number of bloody and audacious attacks 
characterised the first half of the decade including the bombing of the World Trade 
Center in early 1993. In 1996, bin Laden issued the fatwa declaring ‘war’ on the United 
States. A second fatwa followed in 1998 (signed by a number of people including bin 
Laden) in which it was proclaimed that it was the duty of all Muslims to kill both the 
citizens of America and its allies. Attacks proliferated against the United States from 
the August 1998 suicide bombings against US embassies in Nairobi and in Dar es 
Salaam. Most dramatically the USS Cole was attacked whilst in harbour in Aden. This 
trend culminated with the attacks of 9/11 on the US homeland.  
However, for our current purpose, what English adeptly does is to highlight the 
relationship between bin Laden and the political shape of the immediate post Cold 
War environment. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 it was the Saudi fighter who 
offered to assemble an army of Muslims to defend the kingdom against Iraqi attack 
and invasion. In his view, the Mujahideen brothers were more than capable of 
removing Saddam’s forces from Kuwait, having removed the far more formidable 
Soviet Army from Afghanistan. Bin Laden’s dissatisfaction with the Saudi regime and 
its rejection of his offer was deepened by the US military presence deployed as part 
of Operation Desert Shield. The defence of Osama’s homeland was accomplished 
much to his chagrin by the Americans.44 Two and a half years later after the defeat of 
Iraq, US bases were being expanded not dismantled and Saudi Arabia was virtually 
bankrupt. Not only did Bin Laden wish to see the US presence ejected from the holy 
lands, he also wanted to restore to Islam not just to the holy lands and the sacred sites 
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but to witness the imposition of sharia law across the region. In short, he sought a 
theocracy.  
The story as relayed is a vivid evocation of the vision of a certain type of Muslim 
theocracy as the primary form of governance for the Middle East. This was clearly 
about a vision for politics, economics and society. It was also about the expulsion of 
the United States from its position of strength (along with Israel) in the Middle East. 
Much of this was fuelled by the perception that the United States was actively anti-
Muslim and indeed anti-Islam. In this sense, those who see ‘occupation’ of sacred 
lands as the inspiration for suicide bombers point to a deep well of resentment against 
the US presence and its actions building up over a number of decades.  
What English narrates is a classic tale of resistance to occupation but also the 
formation of a competing spectacle of social organisation and behaviour. The attacks 
of 9/11 – born out of frustration, anger and in many respects impotence – prompted 
the US and some of its allies to wage two wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq. These wars 
were highly damaging for Western powers. Military lives were lost to IEDs, insurgent 
attack and visceral warfare around cities like Fallujah45 and the costs in blood and 
treasure proved painful for the Americans, British and their allies. As English points 
out, here again we have that intimate connection between foreign policy and fear of 
retaliation at home.    
A number of interesting points pick up the threads of O’Sullivan’s themes. Increased 
lethality is one theme but so too is the thesis of civilian as victim. Of those 2,976 who 
died in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania on 9/11, the vast majority were 
civilians and innocents drawn from a diverse range of countries and religions. A similar 
mix of ethnicity, gender and nationality marked those who were killed and maimed on 
7/7 in London.  
English too highlights the centrality of the charismatic (or an O’Sullivan would have it 
the malign) leader in al-Qaeda and the importance of the messenger as well as the 
message. Charismatic leadership is a fairly well tracked phenomenon in the study of 
terrorist groups but here English provides a vivid picture of Osama bin Laden and 
those close to him. While it may be something of a stretch to actually accept his jaunty  
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claim that ‘Bin Laden was himself clearly the most stellar member of the al-Qaeda 
band and that ‘In Rolling stones terms he and Ayman al-Zawahiri might perhaps be 
seen as the Jagger and the Richards of the outfit’ there is something interesting. 
Perhaps for many young men (and women) personalities with a powerful message 
have allure.46 Terrorist leaders replacing rock stars are perhaps too fanciful and 
Osama bin laden’s last years in hiding and his violent death in Abbottabad Pakistan 
was anything but glamorous. 47 Yet some of the terrorists do have reach and influence 
upon the young (and the not so young). Most recently in the United Kingdom we have 
the example of young British born Muslim girls fleeing the country to marry ISIS fighters 
who at least on the internet have ‘rock star’ status.  
The killing of Osama bin Laden was a highpoint for the Obama Presidency. The ghosts 
of 9/11 were finally put to rest. But such were the escalating costs of the 9/11 
campaigns that, with the failure of COIN,48 alternative modes of waging the wars 
against terrorism had to be found. The armed drone offered one effective instrument. 
Obama had come to power clear that the Iraq War was the wrong war and the Afghan 
war the right war. His Presidency was initially characterised by apparent military 
successes in the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan but all too soon became mired in the 
unfolding chaos in Libya and Syria as well as the profound disappointment, misreading 
and mishandling of the Arab Spring.  
A Terrorist, A President, And the Rise of the Drone  
Scott Shane has written a dual biography. At the heart is the seeming transformation 
of President Obama from constitutional lawyer and gifted academic to President with 
a ‘kill list’ determined to eradicate through technological means the enemies of the 
United States. The particular target for assassination as explored in this book is an 
individual – Awlaki – equally talented, who for a variety of reasons explored here had 
taken a path from preaching and study to plotting the demise of the United States. As 
Shane phrases it two men and two stories illustrative of the struggle with terrorism. 
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While the two men would never meet, except virtually, they clashed in the public arena 
of ideas and ideology  
The fabric of both lives is framed by stories of circumstance, chance and choice 
through which both men come to represent something at the heart of the contemporary 
struggle between powerful states and those individuals seemingly filled with rage at 
US actions in the Middle East willing to commit acts of terrorism.   
The story may seem somewhat familiar. It is one in which terrorists provoke and 
transform the international agenda and the state responds – with an array of violence. 
There is though a twist  and more than a couple of turns in this story.  Powerful states 
have always responded to threats with armed violence. But here we confront 
something fascinating: that is the dilemma of the President.   Obama had opposed the 
war in Iraq and sought a speedy exit from Afghanistan and lamented the huge financial 
and human losses which had been incurred. Despite this, US military forces were at 
war for all 8 years of Obama’s tenure. He was the first two-term American President 
with that particular distinction.  
He could not, once in office, give up on ‘the war on terror’, however it was re- labelled, 
during his Presidency. His opposition to the operations within the Guantanamo Bay 
prison with all of its grisly dimensions was well known and his disdain for much of the 
activities of the Bush Administration well documented. Yet, whatever his moral 
reservations, there could be no turning away from the terrorist threat at home and 
abroad. Armed drones offered and provided a ‘quick fix’ allowing Obama to lift ‘boots 
off the ground’49 but still target and eliminate individuals on a most wanted ‘kill’ list. 
President Bush had authorised drone strikes in a secret order less than a week after 
the attacks of 9/11. The mission had been to assassinate the most wanted man in the 
world, Osama bin Laden, at a high level al-Qaeda meeting in Kabul. The slippery 
Osama had evaded this particular attack but it had killed his military chief – 
Mohammed Atef. 
The point was that assassination offered the hope of killing an individual and perhaps 
laying to rest the events of 9/11. On 17 September 2001, President Bush had been 
asked ‘do you want bin Laden dead?’ His reply evoked images of criminals in the Wild 
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West beyond the reach of Government: ‘There’s an old poster out West, as I recall 
that said, ‘wanted dead or alive’.50 While Osama escaped the efforts of the Bush 
administration to kill him it was President Obama who not only hunted down Awlaki, 
but Osama himself. The latter was assassinated by a special Navy SEAL team, shot 
at close quarters in his ‘hide out’ in Pakistan and buried at sea. Awlaki was killed by 
drone strike and became the first American to be executed on the order of the 
President since the US Civil War. 
It is worth noting that both men and their killings brought about a public and scholarly 
debate about the legal (and ethical) rights of a state to kill individuals as well as the 
potential consequences: in the early days of the use of drone strikes much was made 
of the potential for violent ‘blowback’ from the families and allies of those killed in this 
manner. That particular preoccupation faded somewhat but the ethical and legal 
debate over the utilisation of armed drones in considerable numbers has not gone 
away. The mounting unease about drones and indeed targeted assassination has 
merely been deepened by the opening months of the Trump presidency. Shane ends 
his story with the legal challenge raised by Awlaki’s father against the US Government 
for the murder of his son.  Part of this fascinating narration is the key question of what 
states can and will do to eliminate enemies both foreign and domestic. The subtext of 
the book is that of the technological fix of an armed drone that permits a President to 
kill with precision: a much vaunted term during the Obama era. Drones are remotely 
piloted across the sky to vaporise enemies of the West.  Of which more later.   
The biographical sections track the life journeys of both men. One of many ironies is 
the fact that the Awlaki story is one of living, experiencing and enjoying the US under 
the guidance of his distinguished father – an agrarian economist. The pathway is one 
of education in the United States and some might argue enlightenment, and then a 
hurried exit as a fugitive and a wanted man to eventually die in the badlands of Yemen. 
Awlaki is killed by the President of a country that he and his family had settled in and 
in many respects thrived in. Awlaki had come to occupy a place in the national public 
narration of religious sentiment and young Muslims in the United States. Here for all 
students of terrorism is an exploration of a descent in to radicalisation. Yet that term, 
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unsatisfactory in so many ways, certainly lacks purchase in the case here. It appears 
from Shane that sex or rather illicit sex, not religious fervour, transformed this young 
man and his destiny.  
The decline of Awlaki is well documented both here and elsewhere by Shane. It is in 
a classic sense a ‘tragic’ tale. Awlaki has become in the wars of 9/11 something of a 
celebrity. His moderate views of Islam are both well known and well received in the 
United States. He was articulate, personal and because he had a knack apparently for 
preaching and publicity quickly becomes the reasonable face of his religion and 
ethnicity. He is a respected preacher and has a successful business in terms of his 
preaching DVDs. He can command the resources of the internet and seemingly pour 
much needed oil on troubled waters of communal division and unease. The power of 
modern communications is apparent and the ability to spread ideas for good or evil 
render him somewhat famous.  
There is however a weakness in this handsome and articulate young man – a 
penchant for extra-marital sex. In between his public engagements there are 
numerous visits to prostitutes. These encounters take place despite his preaching of 
the moral decay of society and his own publicly ‘satisfactory’ family life. His behaviour 
was reckless – in Shane’s judgement ‘staggeringly reckless’.  
As it happens, the FBI, had opened an investigation on the young cleric.  Agents had 
followed every one or at least many of his tawdry liaisons. Alerted to the fact that he 
may be publicly exposed as at best a hypocrite and liar, Awlaki leaves the United 
States in a considerable hurry and heads for London and then Yemen. It is at this point 
that he allegedly turns his talents for preaching into a campaign for jihad against the 
United States.  
The great strength of this book is that it exposes some of the oddities and eccentricities 
through which terrorists are made. Many national authorities puzzle over how young 
men (and increasingly women) become radicalised: according to this account, the 
disclosure of his sexual habits inspired, it would seem, a turn away from the defence 
of moderate Islam and to leadership of an anti-American campaign. As Shane writes, 
the process of radicalisation is not down to a few clear cut and inevitable stages but in 
reality the journey to extremism is a messy human affair – with no predictability. There 
is little comfort for the authorities seeking to prevent radicalisation in this particular 
insight.  
Awlaki became increasingly linked with those who sought to commit acts of violence 
against the citizens and structure of the US. Infamously Awlaki influenced one Farouk 
Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian born ‘underwear bomber’ who sought to detonate himself 
and Northwest Airline Flight 253 as it flew into Detroit on 25 December 2009 and Major 
Nidal Hasson, the US Army psychologist who had massacred 13 people at Fort Hood 
in Texas in 2009. Awlaki’s  control  and ‘guidance’ for these and other individuals such 
as some of the 9/11 hijackers now seem clear. Whilst his fingerprints were not actually 
on the trigger or the explosives, his words and exhortations certainly were significant 
in terms of encouraging terrorism amongst a range of individuals. The Tsarnaev 
brothers who set off the pressure cooker bomb at the Boston Marathon in 2013 were 
inspired by his preaching as was Shannon Conley aged 19 who converted to Islam, 
left Colorado and flew to Syria to join Islamic state. Awlaki had become the ‘bin Laden 
of the internet’. Hence, the preacher was also the moving force behind the highly 
influential ‘Inspire’ magazine produced by his protégé, Samir Khan, also killed in 
Yemen.  
Shane makes much of the clash of ideas and ideals. There is still something rather 
unsatisfactory here. Understandably so. Why did Awlaki transform himself?  
Explanations abound. One that seems ignored is the influence of the technological 
and political material that comprised al-Qaeda’s ideology which was already on the 
ether. This provided a transformative bridge from his personal weakness for sexual 
temptation to an ‘ideal’ state where temptation would be legally satisfied. To achieve 
these personal private motives he adapted his reasonable approach towards religion 
to a rational approach to revolutionary violence.51 This is guesswork of a kind but the 
ramifications of the personal and particular ideological journey are not in doubt.  
The title of the book ‘Objective Troy’ hints at something mythical and classical –an 
allusion to the Trojan horse of deception of power. Perhaps fittingly the Troy of this 
book is something altogether more prosaic. Awalaki, like others placed on a kill list in 
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Yemen was assigned a code name – a name picked from a map of Ohio. The choice 
of Ohio was apparently random and Troy itself was a little town of just 25,000 people. 
This entire detective like story is placed alongside the deepening tumult within the 
Obama Administration. A president who had designated Iraq as the ‘wrong’ war but 
Afghanistan as the right war was still left with the question of how to counter the 
terrorists across a vast space in which it had become increasingly painful (and 
expensive) to counter al-Qaeda and the multiple groups and factions which had been 
spewed out of the 9/11 wars.   
Much has been written on how the armed drone came to be seen as a panacea for 
the failed conduct of both COIN and counter-terror operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and Yemen. (Strictly speaking there were two wars working in parallel. The military 
were tasked with fighting conventional COIN wars and the CIA was fighting the 
counter-terror Wars. CIA drones were the ones most associated with the counter-terror 
campaigns), A large proportion of commentaries have highlighted the obfuscation and 
downright lies of the Obama Administration over collateral damage, civilians and the 
accuracy of intelligence.52 Whatever the controversies, Shane  places the President 
and his drones at the heart of a desire to ‘fix’ the terrorist problem.  
Obama’s comment that he had become ‘really good at killing’ is disturbing for a  
president who had promised much. But context is everything. Obama stands in a long 
line of American presidents buying into the folklore of killing and ‘taking out’ the 
enemies of the state. Much is made of the fact that this was the first presidential ‘extra 
judicial killing’ since the US Civil War – itself evocative of bloody confrontations 
between peoples divided by competing visions of political and economic 
arrangements.  
One codicil to the Shane book is the continuing and in many respects expanding war 
of President Trump against America’s enemies.53 Not only was Awlaki’s son killed by 
drone strike two weeks after his father but his sister – Nawar – was killed in a special 
operations raid in Yemen in early 2017 approved by the new President.54 While no 
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one believes that she was a direct target of the operation, her death from bullet wounds 
provided considerable fodder for propaganda. Here Shane is robustly insistent on the 
legacy of Awlaki. His embrace of radical politics still litters the internet perhaps 
inspiring or colouring the views of many others still hidden from view. Killing Anwar al-
Awlaki made him a better terrorist recruiter, at least according to Shane.  
This is more too in this story. When Awlaki was assassinated in 2011 many believed 
that Al-queda was dying too. This was as we now know overly optimistic and with the 
emergence and tenacity of ISIS the ‘cause’ was reignited on an even larger and more 
formidable scale. Oil revenues, extortion and US weapons (seized from fleeing Iraqi 
troops) equipped the terrorists. In response Obama committed the US to a long war in 
the Middle East and a confrontation not just with the rebels but with Russia and a new 
Cold War. 
What we now know 
This review finished with the story of a President, a fugitive and an armed drone 
assassination. Underpinning this triangle was a state leader willing to breach 
established codes of Presidential behaviour, notions of citizenship and international 
law. All of these were justified in the name of national interest and national defence. 
The threat to the US was personified in an individual (or a number of individuals) who 
was identified and then terminated. The War on Terror started under Bush with wars, 
intervention, prison camps, black sites and extraordinary rendition and considerable 
sacrifice of US troops had morphed in to remote killing.  As such it was a personal 
matter for the President who oversaw every decision to eradicate a foe with a drone 
strike.  If as Richard English asked does terrorism work – the fight against terrorists 
certainly preoccupied much of the Obama Presidency shaping foreign policy and 
action in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen as well as the ongoing war in Syria.  
In turn, the 9/11 wars also shaped much of European politics. Cities such as Madrid, 
London and Paris have borne the brunt of terrorist attacks raising questions familiar to 
Paul Wilkinson about how to respond in policing terms and how to strike the balance 
between intelligence gathering and civil liberties.  The even thornier question of the 
legacies of empire, colonies and the seeming failure of second generation assimilation 
within democracies are littered throughout current terrorism studies. Questions of 
historical responsibility and historical ‘truth’ are emblematic of the division between 
orthodox and critical terrorism scholars as to how ‘we’ got here. The past history of the 
West permits Western history itself to be rewritten as the history of ‘terrorism’. This 
points to the self-confident, uncritical ‘Eurocentric’ perspective that originally shaped 
this concept before the end of the Cold War and with which Wilkinson has been 
associated. Perhaps this is what is so useful in  English’s book: a more if not 
sympathetic then nuanced  and historically grounded interpretation of what these 
groups try to  and sometimes do achieve.  
Let us return to O’Sullivan and understandings of terrorism. How should we think about 
terrorism and concepts of terrorism? The first feature is I think to return to a concept 
of terrorism that is historically grounded in time and place. So the need for deep 
historical knowledge of the particular societies being studied on the part of any one 
theorizing the concept of terrorism. Only this can overcome the tendency to forget or 
misremember the politics of unpalatable episodes or periods in the creation of liberal 
states.55 
The second is that current discourses of democracy and liberal states presuppose the 
existence of a state which is a political community. This is a flaw of the Wilkinson 
volume. The question of how this political entity is constituted is taken as a given 
without a more ‘realist’ type of thinking that does not start from of how ideally people 
ought to act but from the way in which social, economic, political institutions actually 
operate in a particular society at a particular time.56  
Third, we need to recognise that power and conflict is an intrinsic part of the political. 
In other words the political must be acknowledged as a site of durable dissent and 
conflict as a structural inevitability. So the idea of an ideal and harmonious type of 
society underplays or ignores structural dissent.57 Here to return to Scott Shane’s 
President  the idea that ‘kill lists’ and a growing heap of  dead enemies resolves 
structural opposition is not only naïve but ultimately counter productive. This trend 
though is continuing under President Trump who announced in the summer of 2017 
that the mission in Afghanistan was not nation building but killing terrorists.58 
                                                          
55 See here Margaret Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996) 
56 See Raymond Guess, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008) 
57 See M.Freeden, ‘What should the ‘’Political’’ in Political Theory Explore?’ in The Journal of Political 
Philosophy. Vol.13. No.2 pp.113-134.  
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Finally and fourth, any idea that terrorism can simply be reduced to a morality play 
means that the concept loses purchase from what ‘is’ to what ‘should be’. As English 
concludes: ’given the mutually shaping intimacy between non-state terrorists and state 
politics, we need to think humbly about what states do and do not do (and the frequent 
casualness that they display about others suffering) if we want to diminish non-state 
violence in the future.’59 
                                                          
59 Richard English, op.cit. p. 264. 
